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THE RELEVANCE OF THE NLRA AND LABOR ORGANIZATIONS
IN THE POST-INDUSTRIAL, GLOBAL ECONOMY
By Charles B. Craver*
I. INTRODUCTION
When the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA)1 was enacted in 1935, 13.2 percent of
nonagricultural labor force participants were members of labor organizations.2 The United States
had been transformed from an agrarian to an industrial economy, as large manufacturing firms
had been established to produce automobiles, steel, electrical equipment, and similar
commodities. During the mid-1930s, the leadership of the American Federation of Labor (AFL)
created the Committee for Industrial Organization that was intended to develop ways to organize
these new manufacturing companies and divide the new members among existing AFL craft
unions.3  When it became apparent that the skilled, semiskilled, and unskilled workers employed
by large production companies could not be easily assigned to traditional craft unions, the
Committee for Industrial Organization leaders formed the Congress of Industrial Organizations
(CIO) and created new industrial unions including the United Automobile Workers Union, the
United Steelworkers Union, the International Electrical Workers Union, and the United Rubber
Workers Union. 
From 1935 through the mid-1950s, union membership experienced the most rapid
expansion in U.S. history, as the union density rate increased from 13.2 percent to 34.7 percent.4 
Competition between ACL and CIO unions – and the unparalleled success of the newly created
industrial unions – generated significant membership growth. As labor organizations enhanced
their economic power, Congress amended the NLRA in 19475 and in 19596 to prohibit union
unfair labor practices and to limit secondary activity by organized labor.
2In the mid-1950s, the AFL and the CIO united into a single labor federation, and AFL-
CIO unions agreed not to compete with one another to represent the same workers. Although
union membership continued to grow, it did not expand as rapidly as the nonagricultural labor
force. As a result, by 1970, the union density rate had fallen to 27.3 percent.7 Throughout the late
1970s, the U.S. experienced high inflation, fueled by the formation of OPEC and rapidly rising
oil prices. Cost-of-living adjustment clauses contained in many collective bargaining agreements
caused labor costs in unionized manufacturing industries to increase substantially compared to
costs associated with unorganized workers not covered by such contractual provisions. As
businesses sought to reduce labor costs, northern manufacturing jobs were moved to sunbelt
states. Labor-intensive work was often relocated to Maquiladoro plants in Northern Mexico.8 
Electrical manufacturing and clothing production was relocated to low wage Asian countries.
Businesses that continued to produce goods in the U.S. demanded wage and benefit reductions
from labor unions that would enable them to compete with facilities operated in lower wage areas
of the world.
The American economy was being transformed from manufacturing to white-collar,
service, and retail. By 1990, only 16.1 percent of nonagricultural labor force participants were
union members.9 These new businesses were highly competitive, and they worked hard to
discourage their employees from joining labor organizations. Private sector union membership
began to decline substantially. By the end of 2005, only 7.8 percent of private sector,
nonagricultural workers were members of labor organizations.10 If this trend continues, private
sector labor unions will become almost entirely irrelevant in coming years.
Over the past ten to fifteen years, the American economy has changed radically. It has
3been transformed not only from an industrial to a white-collar, service, and retail economy, but
also from long-term, stable employment relations to shorter-term employment arrangements.11
Companies do not hesitate to lay off large numbers of workers as necessary, and many firms use 
independent contractors and ‘permatemps” retained from external employment agencies. 
Millions of manufacturing and service jobs have been outsourced to low-wage workers in
countries like China, Malaysia, and India.
As union density has declined, employee job security and economic benefits have
suffered. Few contemporary workers expect to be employed by the same firms throughout their
adult lives. Over the past forty years, CEO compensation has risen dramatically12 and the Dow-
Jones average has gone from under $1000 to over $10,000.13 During this same period. the real
wages and benefits of regular workers have been stagnant. Without a collective voice provided
by union representatives – or at least the real threat of unionization – employees have not been
able to share in the economic growth U.S. businesses have seen over the past fifteen years.14
A recent study by Professors Richard Freeman and Joel Rogers found that 87 percent of
workers would like some form of collective influence regarding firm decisions that affect their
employment conditions; almost half would like traditional union representation, but they fear
employer reprisals if they openly support unionization.15 Many employers now recognize the
minimal remedies available under the NLRA for unfair labor practices. If they illegally discharge
union supporters, they only have to provide back pay and reinstatement – and these remedies
often take effect several years after the union organizing campaigns in question. Threats of
adverse consequences if workers select union representation do not result in any monetary
remedies. The offending employers will merely be directed not to engage in similar behavior in
4the future.
The NLRA has failed to keep up with economic developments over the past fifty years.
The statute was designed primarily for large manufacturing firms that would have to accept the
inevitability of unionization. It does not work effectively with respect to service and retail firms
that are strongly opposed to union organizing and will work diligently to discourage collective
efforts by their employees. The labor movement has similarly failed to adapt to contemporary
employers and new-age workers. Many unions continue to use blue-collar organizing techniques
to appeal to twenty-first century white-collar and service personnel who think of traditional
unions as “working class” and unprofessional.
This article will explore changes that must be made in the NLRA if it is to be a
meaningful force in the coming years. How should the law be applied to new-age wrokers? What
economic weapons should be available to representative unions, and what unfair labor practice
remedies should be provided to deter and correct improper behavior? We will also examine the
moribund state of the American labor movement and discuss ways union leaders must adapt to
changing circumstances. The recent formation of the Change-to-Win coalition is a step in the
right direction, as leaders from unions like the SEIU, the UFCW, the Teamsters, the Laborers,
and UNITE-HERE work to enhance their organizational strength.16
Labor and employment issues can no longer be considered on a national basis.
Globalization has forced both American employers and workers to appreciate the fact they must
structure their relationships in an environment in which they will be directly affected by
employment policies in other nations. Large firms are no longer ethnocentric with loyalties to
home nations; they are profit-maximizing geocentric entities with loyalties to shareholders but
5not to particular countries or the employees at existing locations. Workers are disposable
commodities who can be replaced by individuals in other areas of the world when it makes
economic sense to make such changes.17 As business firms become more international, labor
organizations may have to coordinate their efforts with unions in other parts of the world. 
II. THE IRRELEVANCY OF THE NLRA IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY WORLD
Following its enactment in 1935, the NLRA had a significant impact upon American
workers as the newly-formed industrial unions organized most of the mass production
companies. By the mid-1950s, almost 35 percent of private sector employees were able to use the
collective voice to influence their wages, hours, and employment conditions.  Millions of
unorganized workers were the indirect beneficiaries of unionized firms, as their employers
maintained sufficiently competitive terms of employment to discourage unionization by their
own personnel.18
The NLRA was a model statute for individuals who worked for large manufacturers.
Industrial unions could represent expansive bargaining units that included production,
maintenance, and even white-collar and clerical workers. Specialized craft unions could carve
out separate units for skilled mechanics, plumbers, tool and die makers, and similar groups. In
some competitive industries like trucking, multi-employer bargaining units were formed that
allowed representative unions to negotiate uniform employment terms covering the vast majority
of employers within the same industry. 
By the late 1980s and early 1990s, the American economy began to change significantly.
Well paid manufacturing workers began to lose their jobs to cost-saving technological
developments and to outsourcing to low-cost foreign countries. Since the NLRA only regulates
6domestic businesses, unions could not regulate the employment conditions of even U.S.-owned
facilities in other areas of the world, and unions could not use that statute to try to organize the
employees of foreign-owned firms in countries like China and India.
The decline in traditional manufacturing jobs was offset by the expansion of white-collar,
service, and retail jobs. Many of the expanding corporations operated smaller facilities in many
different locations. Unions could no longer organize thousands of individuals employed at huge
manufacturing plants. They had to spend more time and money trying to reach workers at
separate locations. Due to the highly competitive nature of these new-age businesses, these
employers worked diligently to discourage worker unionization, fearing that increased labor costs
would make it difficult for them to succeed.19
Employer opposition to unions has reached levels not seen since the early period of the
NLRA. Although firms may lawfully “predict” the likely consequences of unionization if these
statements are based on objective fact and reflect the probable consequences of collectivization,20
companies may not make unsubstantiated threats of plant closures or job relocations.
Nonetheless, there is little legal incentive to avoid such coercive behavior, due to the absence of
any monetary consequences. The sole NLRA remedy consists of cease and desist orders directing
the offending firms not to repeat their improper actions in the future.
It is not uncommon for anti-union employers to resort to more drastic conduct.
Approximately one out of every twenty to thirty individuals who vote in favor of union
representation in NLRB elections is illegally discharged during the organizing campaigns.21
These are usually visible union supporters, and their terminations significantly thwart labor
drives. It generally takes a year or two before final Labor Board or court decisions direct their
7reinstatement with back pay. By then, the unions have usually lost their campaigns, and the
unlawfully terminated workers have found alternative employment. They thus decline their
reinstatement offers. The minimal back pay cost to the offending employers is slight compared to
the increased labor costs that would likely result from unionization.
Even when unions are able to overcome employer opposition and prevail in Labor Board
certification elections, this does not guarantee them successful negotiations. Although the NLRA
requires parties to bargain in good faith, the statute expressly states that this obligation does not
require either party to agree to a particular term or to make a concession.22 As a result, it is often
possible for newly-organized employers to avoid even initial bargaining agreements. Some firms
thwart the bargaining process by engaging in disingenuous and unlawful surface bargaining
where they have no intention of achieving collective contracts. The cost of such illegal conduct is
minimal. There is no monetary remedy, but only an order directing future bargaining. The only
cost to these companies concerns their legal fees.
Another problem associated with the antiquated NLRA concerns statutorily and judicially
defined exclusions from the Act’s coverage. Supervisors are expressly excluded to avoid the
problem of dual loyalties by such persons to their employers and to representative unions. While
this exemption makes sense with respect to real supervisors who possess the authority to hire,
discipline, and meaningfully direct the work of others, the Supreme Court has expanded this
category to include other persons who do not possess the managerial authority generally
associated with supervisory status.  Professional people, like licensed practical nurses and
registered nurses, who in the ordinary course of their regular duties must give relatively rote
directives to their assistants are precluded from organizing by Court decisions finding them
8“supervisors.”23
Similar exclusions are judicially provided for “managerial” personnel who formulate and
effectuate management policies.24 This exclusion also makes sense for persons who really
determine company personnel policies, but it has been expanded beyond anything reasonably
related to bona fide corporate needs. For example, in NLRB v. Yeshiva University,25 the Supreme
Court held that faculty members at mature colleges and universities are excluded “managerials”
because of the fact they influence admission and graduation requirements and determine course
contents. Even though they exercise no control over their wages and benefits and only minimal
control over their working conditions, the Court seemed to think it would be unseemly for such
well-educated people to resort to unionization.
An additional barrier to worker representation in the U.S. concerns the exclusivity
doctrine codified in Section 9(a) of the NLRA.26 Under this provision, the labor organization
selected by a majority of the employees within a particular bargaining unit becomes the exclusive
representative for all of the individuals within that unit. On the other hand, if a union is only able
to generate support among 40 to 45 percent of the people in a unit, it may not be granted
exclusive bargaining rights.27 Although the union could seek to function on a members-only
basis, representing only the individuals who have specifically authorized it to negotiate in their
behalf, the Labor Board has not required employers to bargain with such minority unions.
If several modifications – most relatively minor – were made in the NLRA, it would
become a more relevant and effective statute. Some of these could be accomplished through
Labor Board or court decisions, while others would require legislative action. The NLRB should
follow the high  standard articulated by the Supreme Court with respect to the propriety of
9employer “predictions” regarding the likely consequences of unionization. Such statements had
to satisfy three critical requirements: “[T]he prediction must be carefully phrased on the basis of
objective fact to convey an employer’s belief as to demonstrably probable consequences beyond
his control. . .”28 Statements of possible plant closures or job losses that might result from
unionization should be generally prohibited – unless the employer can demonstrate that the
predicted consequences are almost certain to result from union-imposed labor cost increases.
The chilling effect associated with the unlawful termination of key union supporters
during organizing drives could easily be diminished by a long-overdue change in Section 10(l) of
the NLRA. When the law was amended in 1947, Congress recognized that there would be times
when the delay associated with regular Labor Board adjudication procedures would preclude the
effective remediation of unfair labor practices. It thus added Section 10(j)29 which allows – but
does not require – the Labor Board to petition a district court for temporary injunctive relief to
restore the status quo ante while the unfair labor practice complaint is being adjudicated.
Congress also added Section 10(l)30 which requires the Board to seek such injunctive relief while
charges involving secondary activities under Section 8(b)(4)31 or organizational or recognitional
picketing under Section 8(b)(7)32 by labor organizations are involved. Although resort to Section
10(j) relief is relatively rare, the use of mandatory Section 10(l) restraining orders has
significantly reduced the impact of unlawful secondary boycotts and organizational and
recognitional picketing.
Section 10(l) should be amended to equalize the remedial scheme affecting labor and
management. While such temporary relief should continue to cover coercive secondary activity
and organizational and recognitional picketing by unions, it should be expanded to cover certain
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pernicious employer unfair labor practices. For example, Section 10(l) should require the Labor
Board to seek the immediate reinstatement of employees who have been clearly discharged
during organizing campaigns because of their union support, to prevent employers from
benefitting from such illegal terminations throughout the entire campaign period. This remedy
would be far more effective than enhanced monetary relief that could only be imposed long after
the representation elections have been conducted.
Section 10(l) relief should also be mandated with respect to manifestly unjustified
employer refusals to bargain with newly-certified labor organizations. When it is clear that
employer bad faith is thwarting bargaining designed to achieve initial agreements, the Board
should be required to seek temporary injunctive relief ordering the offending firms to bargain in
good faith. Parties that fail to honor such court orders would be subject to civil and/or criminal
contempt sanctions.
Section 2(11)33 should be modified to make it clear that only individuals possessing real
managerial authority should be excluded from statutory coverage as “supervisors.” They should
have to have the power not only to meaningfully direct the work of others – but also to discipline
such persons if they fail to carry out the supervisory directives. Professionals, like nurses,
frequently work with nonprofessional assistants who must be told what to do. When these
relationships are really those between professional and paraprofessional colleagues, non-
supervisory status should be found with respect to the professionals involved.
Congress should similarly amend Section 2(3)34 to limit the scope of the common law
“managerial” exclusion. Only those persons who meaningfully participate in the determination of
important management policies should be excluded from statutory coverage. People, like
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academics, who minimally influence employment conditions should not be denied the
opportunity to select bargaining representatives.
The last significant modification of NLRA coverage would pertain to labor organizations
that are unable to attain majority support among the employees in specific bargaining units.
Professor Charles Morris has cogently argued that the existing language contained in Section
8(a)(5)35 actually requires employers to bargain with minority unions on a members-only basis.36
He notes that such arrangements were common when the NLRA was originally enacted, and he
believes that the exclusivity status accorded to majority representatives under Section 9(a) is
entirely separate from the general bargaining duty imposed by Section 8(a)(5) with respect to
both majority and minority unions. If this interpretation of the existing statute is not judicially
accepted, Congress should carefully consider the impact of a provision that would require
businesses to bargain with minority unions on a members-only basis. Such a scheme would
clearly assist employees who authorize unions to bargain on their behalf, and it would probably
also benefit the other workers who would presumably be given most of the benefits negotiated by
the labor organization for its express supporters. On the other hand, Congress might have to
consider how to deal with situations in which different unions seek members-only bargaining for
diverse groups of employees within the same employment group. It could always limit members-
only bargaining to the union that has obtained the support of the greatest number of workers
within the same overall unit.
Even if the NLRA was modified to more effectively protect the right of workers to
organize, it is likely that the vast majority of private sector personnel would remain nonunion.
Under the American employment-at-will rule, which allows employers to terminate employees at
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any time for almost any reason, workers would continue to have no real job security. In addition,
they would have no way to meaningfully influence their basic terms of employment. They must
either accept what is offered to them or seek work elsewhere.
During the 1980s and 1990s, many companies created worker participation committees
designed to enhance productivity and quality. Most of these committees are selected by
management officials, and they address issues formulated by corporate leaders. Efforts were
made to change Section 8(a)(2),37 which makes it an unfair labor practice for employers to
dominate “labor organizations” which are defined to include even informal employee committees
that represent the interests of other workers and which “deal with” employers over wages, hours,
or working ocnditions.38 Due to the one-sided nature of these entities, firms were able to benefit
greatly from their existence without having to share the gains with contributing workers.
If America wants to provide true industrial democracy for the millions of private sector
employees not represented by labor organizations, Congress should either amend the NLRA or
enact separate legislation that would allow rank-and-file personnel to elect a certain percentage
of corporate boards and require all board members to have a dual fiduciary obligation to
shareholders and employees.39 In addition, corporations should have to establish employee
involvement committees that would work with management officials to further firm and worker
interests.40 Committee members would be elected by regular workers, and business leaders would
be obliged to furnish committee members with information relevant to the employment
conditions of persons represented by those committees.  Management officials would be required
to consult with involvement committees before implementing decisions that would significantly
affect the job security or employment interests of regular workers. These employee involvement
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committees would have far less power than the works councils in countries like Germany or
Sweden, but they would recognize the critical input of workers to the success of corporate
endeavors.
III. THE RELEVANCE OF LABOR ORGANIZATIONS IN THE TWENTY-FIRST
CENTURY
In 1886, the AFL was formed and Samuel Gompers was elected that organization’s first
president.41 This was the beginning of “business unionism,” with AFL entities operating
primarily as trade unions and not as social or political institutions.42 They sought to organize
individuals who worked in different trades and to advance their interests through the bargaining
process. Although they frequently supported political candidates who were supportive of worker
interests and lobbied in favor of legislation that benefitted employees,43 these activities were
secondary to the basic represenational function advanced through conventional collective
bargaining.
Despite strong employer opposition, union membership increased from 447,000 in 1897
to over 2,000,000 by 1904.44 Most of these union members were men, because most AFL
affiliates did not permit or did not encourage female membership. Even though female labor
force participants grew from four million to over eight million between 1890 and 1910, only
73,000 women were union members by 1910.45 During this period, AFL leaders did little to
discourage gender-based restrictions imposed by member unions.46 Nonetheless, some unions
recognized the receptivity of female workers to labor entreaties, and representatives from the
clerks, garment workers, and meat cutters unions created the Women’s Trade Union League at
the 1903 AFL convention.47
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Most AFL affiliates had a similar antipathy toward minority workers.48 These
exclusionary practices ultimately caused serious problems for unionized workers. Following
World War I, many southern black workers relocated to northern cities. Since they were not able
to obtain jobs with employers that had closed shop agreements with racially restrictive craft
unions, many were induced to work as strike breakers.49 Many of these discriminatory practices
continued until the enactment of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
By the time the NLRA was passed in 1935, AFL leaders were trying to decide how to
handle the workers in mass production industries. They established a federal labor union for each
industry that was supposed to organize the workers within each industry, then divide them among
AFL affiliates having jurisdiction over their respective crafts.50 At the 1934 AFL convention,
William Green and John L. Lewis proposed the creation of new industrial unions, but this
proposal was soundly defeated.51
In 1935, officers from the United Mine Workers, the International Typographical
Workers, the Amalgamated Clothing Workers, the International Ladies Garment Workers, the
United Textile Workers, the Oil Field, Gas Well, and Refining Workers, the United Hatters, Cap,
and Millinery Workers, and the Mine, Mill, and Smelter Workers met in Washington, D.C., and
established the Committee for Industrial Organization.52 This committee created different
organizing entities pertaining to the steel, textile, automobile, rubber, chemical, shipping, and
electronics industries. AFL President William Green was concerned that the Committee for
Industrial Organization would infringe the jurisdictions of existing AFL affiliates, and he
demanded that this group be dissolved.53 Nonetheless, the Committee for Industrial Organization
continued with its plans to organize the mass production industries. When AFL opposition
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stiffened, the unions participating in the Committee for Industrial Organization withdrew from
the AFL and formed the Congress of Industrial Organizations (CIO).54 During the next two
decades, AFL craft unions and CIO industrial unions competed with one another to organize
manufacturing workers.
Most of the newly-formed CIO unions were supportive of minority and female workers
and welcomed them into their ranks. Due in large part to the success of CIO affiliates, the percent
of nonagricultural labor force participants in labor organizations grew from under 15 in 1935 to
almost 35 by the mid-1950s.55 By the late 1940s, business leaders had become concerned about
the expanding economic power of the labor movement, and they sought political assistance. The
1947 Taft-Hartley Act and the 1959 Landrum-Griffin Act amendments to the NLRA significantly
reduced the ability of labor organizations to use secondary tactics to support primary disputes.56
Despite the organizing achievements of CIO unions and the continued vitality of AFL
affiliates, labor leaders did not like the inter-organizatiional competition that had existed since
the formation of the CIO. In December of 1955, the AFL and CIO united into a single
federation57 that explicitly precluded the overt competition that had effectively strengthened the
labor movement during the prior two decades. Although the absolute number of individuals in
labor organizations grew from 17,000,000 in 1955 to 22,000,000 in 1980, the percent of
nonagricultural labor force participants in unions declined from 35 to 23, because union
expansion did not keep pace with the rapid growth of the labor force due to post-war, baby-boom
entrants.58
Since the early 1980s, the position of labor has declined in both absolute terms and as a
percentage of the labor force. By 1990, there were 16,740,000 members comprising 16.1 percent
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of labor force participants.59 Today, there are 15,700,000 union members comprising 12.5
percent of labor force participants.60 These figures mask the actual decline in private sector
membership, because it includes the 36.5 percent of federal, state, and municipal personnel who
are union members. There are presently only 8,255,000 private sector union members,
representing a private sector union density of 7.8 percent.61
Diverse factors have contributed to the decline in private sector union membership.62
Female labor force participation has increased dramatically over the past three decades from 45
percent to almost 60 percent.63  The labor force participation rate for African-American, Asian,
and Hispanic workers has also expanded rapidly.64 Due at least partially to historical exclusionary
policies, female and minority employees have not been as easy to organize as white males.
The transformation of the U.S. economy from an industrial base to a white-collar, service,
and retail base has weakened most of the traditional industrial unions like the Auto Workers, the
Steel Workers, the Rubber Workers, and the Electrical Workers. Technological changes have
eliminated many jobs, and increased globalization65 has caused the outsourcing of many high-
paying American jobs to lower-wage countries like China, Malaysia, and India. To retain their
flexibility, many firms have ceased hiring people to work on a long-term basis.66 Many positions
are now short-term, causing workers to change jobs and even occupations frequently. Firms are
increasingly using independent contractors and permatemps retained from outside employment
agencies to perform job tasks previously performed by regular employees.67
U.S. unions are feeling substantial pressure from multinational business firms seeking to
reduce overall labor costs. If labor organizations seek to protect the wages and benefits enjoyed
by American workers, the jobs of such persons may be transferred to other countries. If they
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succumb to corporate demands to reduce wages and benefits, they generate dissatisfaction not
only among the directly affected persons but also among workers in general who view unions as
impotent institutions.
As a result of competitive pressures both within the U.S. and from global markets,
corporate employers have become increasingly opposed to unions. They tell their workers that if
they join unions and engage in work stoppages, they can be permanently replaced,68 and they
“predict” that increased labor costs will cause them to close plants and/or transfer work to lower-
cost facilities in other countries. Employees reasonably fear that unionization will generate job
losses, and they hesitate to vote for representation.
New-age workers also fear a decline in class position and professional status if they join
traditional trade unions. Most Americans consider themselves to be “middle class.” While they
can accept the thought of being lower middle class, they have an aversion to being lower class or
working class.69 Class-based concerns especially affect white-collar and semi-professional
personnel. This concern allows anti-union employers to suggest during organizing campaigns
that union membership by people employed in financial, insurance, health care, education,
computer processing, and similar fields would be professionally demeaning. If twenty-first
century labor unions hope to organize these types of workers, they have to transform themselves
from blue-collar industrial entities into new-age institutions that will appeal to contemporary
workers.
Some of the large U.S. businesses that perform services primarily within the U.S. remain
unorganized. These include finance, health care, insurance, higher education, hardware and
software providers, retail stores, and fast food chains. Labor officials recognize that they must be
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able to organize these twenty-first century industries if unions are to remain relevant institutions.
Most of the individuals who work in these job sectors have less job security than they previously
enjoyed, and their wage and benefit packages have been stagnant or have declined when adjusted
for inflation. Many would undoubtedly contemplate unionization if they did not fear negative
employment consequences from such action.
AFL-CIO President John Sweeney acknowledges that affiliate unions have not committed
sufficient resources to the organizing of new members. He recently proposed that half of the
$0.61 per-month per capita that affiliates contribute to the AFL-CIO for political and grassroots
mobilization be committed to organizing activities.70 He also proposed that up to $15 million in
rebates be provided to affiliate unions that devote thirty percent of their budgets to organizing
endeavors.
A group of dissident union leaders have challenged President Sweeney to do more.
Teamster President James Hoffa unsuccessfully sought a fifty percent rebate of the 61 cent per
capita to affiliates that commit either ten percent of their total budgets or $2 million to
organizing.71 SEIU President Andrew Stern proposed that smaller AFL-CIO affiliates be merged
to create larger organizations that would have the financial resources to compete with one
another to organize targeted occupations and businesses like Wal-Mart.72 When union officials
from the SEIU, UFCW, UNITE-HERE, the Laborers, and the Teamsters decided that AFL-CIO
leaders were not doing enough to stem the decline of the labor movement, they withdrew their
unions from the AFL-CIO and formed the Change-to-Win coalition.73
Even though AFL-CIO and Change-to-Win officials are striving to reverse the declining
fortunes labor organizations have experienced since the early 1980s, their efforts have continued
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to be insufficient. Both groups have promised to commit greater financial resources to
organizational activities, but they are continuing to employ twentieth century techniques and
institutions to appeal to twenty-first century employees. They plan to use existing old-age unions
to entice new-age workers. Despite the outstanding reputations of many labor organizations, they
are not apt to generate enthusiasm among white-collar and professional personnel. AFL craft
unions learned this lesson in the 1930s when they tried to maintain traditional craft jurisdictions
while seeking to organize heterogeneous mass production occupations. It is time for AFL-CIO
and Change-to-Win leaders to recognize that they are trying to do the same thing now with new-
age workers.
When unions like the Teamsters, the UAW, or the SEIU endeavor to organize highly
educated academic or health care professionals, they are met with understandable skepticism.
How can organizations that have historically represented truck drivers, car manufacturers, or
janitors appreciate and enhance the interests of professional workers? Individuals who join such
trade unions are afraid that they will undermine their professional status. Similar problems would
arise if conventional craft or industrial unions seek to organize white-collar personnel in finance,
insurance, or computer occupations.
Existing AFL-CIO and Change-to-Win affiliates can be successful if they target
employees within their existing jurisdictions. For example, the Retail Clerks and the SEIU
should focus their efforts on retail clerks employed by grocery and department stores. A joint
effort to organize Wal-Mart, K-Mart, and similar stores could succeed if sufficient funds and
skilled organizers were dedicated to this substantial undertaking. Appropriate AFL-CIO and
Change-to-Win unions should work together to reach Wal-Mart personnel. Most of these people
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are underpaid compared to their unionized counterparts at firms like Costco, and their fringe
benefits have been less generous.74 A carefully coordinated, multi-union organizing campaign
undertaken on a region-by-region basis may generate significant success among many of the 1.2
million persons employed by Wal-Mart.
Contemporary unions can no longer rely upon the communication avenues of the past.
They need to utilize e-mail and the Internet. Employers may limit employee e-mail use to firm-
related business, but few do so. If they allow their workers to use e-mail and Internet access for
personal and non-business reasons, they may not prohibit use of these communication modes to
discuss unionization issues.75 Unions must send e-mail messages to every employee of targeted
firms, establish worker chat rooms, and create flashy homepages that workers can visit to learn
about the benefits of unionization.76 They should also encourage firm employees to communicate
with each other via e-mail during their non-work times regarding their interest in unionization. 
Unions must employ a different approach with respect to new-age workers in academic,
health care, finance, insurance, and computer occupations. It is in areas like this that labor leaders
must learn from the lessons of the mid-1930s when the CIO was formed to appeal to workers in
mass production industries. New labor organizations must be created that reflect the hopes and
aspirations of persons employed in these white-collar and professional occupations. To avoid the
professional and personal stigma associated with membership in traditional trade unions,77 these
institutions should be called professional associations.
When school teachers initially thought about the need for collectivization to enhance their
economic and professional interests, they were attracted to the National Education Association a
professional organization opened to all teachers and administrators. A number of teachers felt
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more comfortable joining the NEA than the AFL-CIO affiliated American Federation of
Teachers, even though the AFT did not have the word “union” in its title. They simply thought
that becoming involved with a conventional trade union would be unprofessional and would
cause them a loss of status. Similar considerations induced nurses to seek collective action
through the American Nurses Association.
Labor officials seeking to organize new-age employees must appreciate the different
interests of these individuals. Since their salaries are usually higher than those enjoyed by less
educated workers, they tend to be more interested in professional development than economic
issues. They desire respect for their work, and a reasonable degree to professional autonomy.
They would like the opportunity to enhance their skills – and mobility – through additional
education. This objective may be accomplished through formal degree or certificate programs, or
less formal professional development courses. Since they tend to have a thorough understanding
of their particular positions and where they fit within the overall structure of their employing
firms, they often wish to have a more direct say in where their employers are heading. They want
to be consulted before major decisions are made by management officials that will directly affect
their work and their job security. Although they could attempt to achieve these objectives on an
individual basis, they would be unlikely to have any bargaining power vis-a-vis their corporate
employers. Only a form of collectivization would be able to provide them with the authority to
influence their real employment conditions.
When the CIO was created, it established new industrial unions that would appeal to
workers in mass production occupations. New labor entities should now be created with
jurisdictions covering twenty-first century occupations. These organizations would not have to be
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wholly independent entities – they could be affiliated with existing labor organizations. Current
AFL-CIO and Change-to-Win leaders should create new affiliates with jurisdictions pertaining to
the different new-age occupations. The Association of Finance Professionals could be used to
organize people employed by commercial banks, mortgage companies, brokerage firms, and
similar financial institutions. As these persons are forced to work longer hours and are affected
by competition from workers in low-wage countries like India, they may become more receptive
to unionization. The Association of Health Care Professionals could be established to organize
registered and licensed practical nurses, other staff professionals, and even physicians employed
by health maintenance organizations, public and private hospitals, and similar institutions. As
huge for-profit firms take over more health care institutions, the nurses and physicians may feel
more like regular employees than health care professionals. Patient care will increasingly become
secondary to profit considerations, and the affected health care professionals may desire a
collective voice to further their individual and professional interests. Both of these organizations
could be affiliated with an entity like the SEIU, but they would have to be sufficiently
autonomous to convince targeted persons that they are joining professional associations instead
of regular unions.
The Association of Academic Professionals could seek to organize the growing number
of adjunct professors employed on a relatively long-term basis to teach courses previously taught
by tenure-track faculty members. If the Yeshiva University decision78 finding that faculty
members are “managerial” workers excluded from NLRA coverage could be judicially or
legislatively overturned, many regular professors would undoubtedly contemplate the benefits of
unionization as they have at state colleges covered by state public sector bargaining laws. In the
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Brown University decision,79 the Labor Board overturned precedent and held that graduate
teaching and research assistants are students, rather than employees, who are thus excluded from
NLRA coverage. If this determination was ultimately changed by judicial decision or
congressional action, many under-paid and over-worked graduate teaching and research
assistants would be likely to select union representation. The availability of a “professional
association would undoubtedly be more appealing to such highly educated professionals than a
traditional trade union. This organization could easily be affiliated with the NEA or the AFT.
The expansive insurance industry has not been particularly receptive to unionization. This
is due to the fear the semi-professionals in this field have that collective action would erode their
professional and class status. If an Association of Insurance Professionals was established –
perhaps by the SEIU – and it hired educated organizers who could reflect the professional values
of insurance industry workers, significant inroads could be achieved. Association organizers
could focus on the need for on-going professional development and the need to limit outsourcing
of work to low-cost foreign workers and to permatemps with limited attachment to the insurance
firms using their services.
During the 1990s, computer firms flourished and many highly skilled workers became
wealthy. Once the high-tech bubble burst and many industry professionals lost their jobs, many
began to appreciate the need for a collective voice. An Association of Computer Professionals
could be established to further the professional objectives of these individuals and to soften the
impact of industry recessions.
Organizers working for these new professional associations would have to approach
targeted employees carefully. They should emphasize that most U.S. businesses are members of
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professional organizations they use to further their economic interests. Large groups like the U.S.
Chamber of Commerce represent expansive industries, while more focused entities represent the
plastics, chemical, pharmaceutical, and similar groups. The American Bar Association furthers
the economic and professional interests of lawyers, while the American Medical Association
serves the interests of physicians. Workers are the only major group without a collective voice.
Organizers have to demonstrate to new-age workers how impotent they are when they interact
individually vis-a-vis their corporate employers.
Professional association officials must appreciate the fact that many contemporary
workers do not want to be associated with entities that operate on an adversarial basis.80 In a
highly competitive global world, employee representatives must cooperate with American firms
to guarantee on-going viability. They need not, however, do this at the expense of the employees
involved.
Labor organizers have to recognize that they are dealing with a highly diverse, twenty-
first century work force. Almost half of labor force participants are women,81 and an increasing
percentage consists of minority group members.82 Studies indicate that both female and minority
employees are receptive to unionization.83 To enhance their appeals to these labor force
participants, organizers should establish relationships with special interest groups like 9-to-5, the
National Organization for Women, MALDEF, and the NAACP. Unions should also use their
existing affiliations with organizations like the Coalition of Labor Union Women, the Coalition
of Black Trade Unionists, the Labor Council on Latin American Advancement, and the Asian
Pacific American Labor Alliance.84
Organizers must also emphasize issues of special interest to female and minority workers.
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Women employees are more concerned about family obligations than many of their male cohorts,
especially since more single-parent families are headed by females than males.85 As a result,
organizers need to discuss family leave policies, the availability of day care programs, and job
sharing for parents who wish to work less than full-time to spend more time with their children.
They should similarly emphasize ways to further female advancement within firms where
managers are primarily male. Equal pay is another critical issue, since many women earn less
than comparable male colleagues. Minority employees are similarly concerned about equal
employment opportunities, and organizers need to stress the importance of nondiscrimination
policies and their enforcement through grievance-arbitration procedures.
The formation of professional associations directed to persons employed in particular
occupations and the use of organizing appeals designed to appeal to both new-age workers and
the increasing numbers of female and minority labor force participants should allow organizers to
expand the ranks of union members. As these representatives demonstrate their capacity to
further worker interests and to provide individuals with a collective voice to influence their
employment conditions, more employees would be likely to consider the benefits to be derived
from unionization. Just as the American Nurses Association and the National Education
Association were able to become established labor organizations, newly created professional
associations could also experience significant success. Labor’s decline reversed, and worker
organizations could again become viable economic forces in twenty-first century employment
settings.
IV. CONCLUSION
The NLRA has become an antiquated law that does not adequately protect the rights of
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twenty-first century workers. It was designed for unions organizing mass production industries,
and it functioned well in that regard. As the U.S. has been transformed from an industrial to a
white-collar, service, and retail economy that is increasingly being affected by globalization and
competition from foreign nations, employers have increasingly viewed representative unions as
uncompetitive and inefficient institutions. Labor Board and court decisions have narrowed the
scope of statutory protections provided to professional workers, and the statute’s remedial
provisions have become ineffective. Changes should be made in the statute to restore the scope
of coverage and to more effectively counteract employer unfair labor practices.
The labor movement has also reached a moribund state, teetering on the brink of
irrelevancy. The recent decision of several important unions to leave the AFL-CIO to form the
Change-to-Win coalition may help to revitalize the movement as different entities compete with
one another as CIO industrial unions competed with AFL craft unions during the late 1930s and
1940s. Nonetheless, many unions continue to use blue-collar techniques to organize new-age
workers of the twenty-first century. To counteract the negative connotations associated with
membership in traditional trade unions, AFL-CIO and Change-to-Win leaders should establish
new professional associations that could more effectively appeal to white-collar and professional
employees. Organizers should also work with special interest groups that could help them to
appeal to female and minority workers. If union officials can adopt changes that will make their
organizations more appealing to twenty-first century personnel, they can again become vital
institutions that can meaningfully advance the interests of Ame rican workers.
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